Mr Salmond thanks people “above all for Scotland for 1.6 million votes for Scottish independence”.
“It’s important to say that our referendum was an agreed and consented process and Scotland has decided not, at this stage, to become an independent country.
“I accept that verdict of the people and I call on all of Scotland to follow suit in accepting the democrat verdict of the people of Scotland.”
A triumph, he says, for the democratic process and participation in politics.
Scotland expects the increased powers promised by Westminster leaders to be honoured in rapid course, he adds.
We have witnessed the “scare and fear at the heart of the Westminster establishment as they realised the mass movement of people that was going forward in Scotland.”
“We shall go forward as one nation, thank you very much.”
PICTURES OF THE HISTORICAL VOTES
IN THE final weeks of the Scottish referendum campaign, it became a cliché to say that the political tremors emitted by a Novote would be almost as violent as those from a Yes vote. This was an exaggeration. If Yes had prevailed, it would probably have been the end of David Cameron’s leadership. Sterling would have plunged. A 307-year-old union would have crumpled. Britain’s global swagger—such as it is—would have been at an end.
But in some respects the cliché was accurate. The No victory, by a margin of about 55% to 45%, will now resonate noisily, and not just in Scotland.
The initial reaction will be ugly, even in the winning No camp. As the sighs of relief subside (give it a couple more hours) the recriminations will begin. The referendum race was never expected to get as close as it did in its final weeks: two months ago, the No side had a better than 20-point lead in the polls. For that, there is much blame to go around. The prime minister agreed to a referendum question that benefited the nationalists; Alistair Darling ran an uninspiring “No” campaign; Labour lost touch with its working-class Scottish base; businesses were to slow to warn against independence.
Others will complain that a No vote has been won at far too high a price. On September 8th Gordon Brown, the former Labour prime minister, told Scots that they would be rewarded with “a modern form of Scottish Home Rule” if they stayed in the union. New powers for Edinburgh would be rushed through Parliament, he pledged, adding that a draft bill would be published by Burns Night (January 25th). The Barnett Formula, which ensures Scotland dollops of public money, would endure. The leaders of all three big political parties backed Mr Brown’s offer, but not all MPs do. Several Conservatives have called for a stingier spending settlement and questioned the case for drastic further devolution.
Alex Salmond, the Scottish National Party leader, will also be pilloried for his handling of the Yes campaign. In its early months, when Mr Salmond’s Scottish National Party ran it, the Yes cause lacked energy or strategy. Only when various left-wing groups rallied did it gather the momentum that made it such a formidable force in the final months of the campaign. Even then, early failures, such as the lack of a clear stance on vital issues like currency, bedeviled the campaign. Non-SNP figures in the Yes movement are already planning a full-throated denunciation of SNP leaders, specifically Mr Salmond. Nicola Sturgeon, his deputy, is known to share some of their gripes. The first minister will retort that the campaign extracted great concessions from London. Still, in the febrile, emotionally shattered atmosphere of the Yes campaign, a leadership challenge or even the emergence of a rival nationalist party are possible.
And what will the nationalists do next? Perhaps they will be patient and pragmatic, support the transfer of further powers to Scotland and bide their time. Another Conservative government after the 2015 general election, followed by a referendum on Britain’s EU membership, might give them another chance to push for secession quickly. But, equally, they might prove truculent, insisting (as they did in the final days of the campaign) that a shadowy scare campaign dissuaded Scots who want independence from voting for it. In which case, calls for a new referendum will come quickly.
Meanwhile the unionist parties will attempt to crack on with the promised devolution without upsetting English MPs, who will have to ratify a further transfer of powers. Mr Brown has already been granted an adjournment debate in Parliament on October 16th in which to set out a full timetable and outline his proposals. These include a written constitution for the United Kingdom and the transformation of the House of Lords into a senate of representatives from its four constituent nations. The main political parties will probably thank him for his ideas, then get down to thrashing out a more modest set of reforms. The Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats all promise further devolution; the Tories are the most radical, insisting that full power over income tax be transferred to Edinburgh.
This will put Scotland on the road to autonomy akin to that enjoyed by an American state. In a unitary political system like Britain’s, it will cause mighty constitutional problems, which will have to be worked out—almost certainly amid a good deal of shouting.
The first objection raised to further devolution will be an old one, but given new energy. Why, English MPs will ask, can Scottish MPs vote on huge swathes of legislation (education, health and the like) that only affect the English—or sometimes the English, Welsh and Northern Irish? This “West Lothian question”, as it was long ago dubbed, already irks Conservative MPs. Some have called for an English Parliament or for English-only votes in the House of Commons—either of which would tend to give them the whip hand, since the party is far stronger in England than it is in Scotland.
Neither would be at all easy to set up. England is far too dominant in the United Kingdom to have its own legislature: the first minister of an English parliament would be as powerful—more so in some ways—than the prime minister of Britain. And the Westminster model is predicated on equality of status for MPs. Still, Mr Cameron and the other main party leaders will probably have to introduce an English dimension into the legislature. The most feasible option, suggested by a commission last year, would be to send some legislation through English committees for amendment before a final vote of the whole house.
The second response to Britain’s growing constitutional imbalance will be calls—which are already mounting—for greater devolution within England. If Scotland, with some 5m residents, controls education, welfare and tax rates, why should regions and conurbations with similar populations be run from London? The Electoral Reform Society and others have called for a constitutional convention to discuss such matters. This initiative, though wonkish, has political support from prominent local politicians (in Manchester, for example) and from Nick Clegg, the deputy prime minister, who has promised to be “on the picket lines” pushing for stronger local government. A flurry of recent reports from think-tanks has furnished such figures with blueprints for such a decentralisation.
So the United Kingdom will stay united. But it will also be looser and constitutionally messier than in the past. “No Thanks does not mean no change”, Better Together campaigners assured Scots over the final weeks of the campaign. How right they were.
