In 2025, Nigeria witnessed a monumental restructuring with the creation of several new states. Driven by decades of agitation for local autonomy, fair resource distribution, and identity recognition, this administrative recalibration has recalibrated Nigeria’s geopolitical landscape. The establishment of these new states signals both hope and uncertainty for Africa’s most populous nation.
This extensive report analyses the economic implications, political dynamics, emerging actors, and the future character of Nigerian states in the aftermath of this significant national transformation.
The recent agitation for state creation in Nigeria has once again reshaped the national conversation around identity, governance, and resource control. In the shadows of historical neglect and decades of suppressed aspirations, communities long subsumed within larger administrative territories are demanding their own space on the federal map. Yet, as Nigeria moves towards the creation of Anioma, Ijebu, Ibadan, Oil Rivers, Orlu, Etiti, and Tiga states, a deeper, critical reflection is necessary—one that goes beyond emotional agitation or political expediency.
Historically, state creation in Nigeria has served both as a response to legitimate cries for equity and as a tool for political manipulation. From the first twelve states carved out of four regions in 1967 under General Yakubu Gowon, to the thirty-six states structure cemented under General Sani Abacha in 1996, the logic has oscillated between decentralizing governance and consolidating federal control. The argument often advanced is that smaller administrative units foster development, deepen representation, and promote ethnic harmony. However, the reality over time has shown that proliferation of states, without structural reforms, often results in administrative burden, fiscal dependency, and an endless cycle of new marginalizations within newly created entities.
Take for instance the proposed Oil Rivers State, carved from the heart of Rivers State. While proponents argue that the Bonny, Opobo, and Andoni axis has long been marginalized under the dominance of Port Harcourt and Ikwerre politics, the critical question is whether Oil Rivers can sustain itself economically and administratively. Bonny Island, despite its oil wealth and strategic LNG infrastructure, functions more as an industrial enclave controlled by multinationals than as a broad-based economic hub for the general population. Beyond its oil terminals, Oil Rivers lacks a diversified revenue base, functional urban centers, and the human capital depth to sustain a full-fledged state bureaucracy. Thus, creating Oil Rivers may end up deepening dependency on federal allocations, transforming what is now an industrialized sub-region into an administrative center struggling with capital overheads and duplicated ministries.
Similarly, the case of Ibadan State stands on more solid historical and economic grounds. As Nigeria’s third-largest city and the heart of Yorubaland, Ibadan has long been the engine room of commerce, politics, and education. Yet, trapped within the larger Oyo State—dominated politically by power blocs from Ogbomosho and Oke-Ogun—the city’s potential has remained under-leveraged. Its call for a separate state is both practical and strategic: Ibadan possesses the infrastructure, urban economy, and population to operate as a self-sustaining state, similar to Lagos. The ancient Olubadan institution also commands deep cultural cohesion that can anchor governance in the nascent state.
However, the exclusion of Oke-Ogun State from the new state creation list is both glaring and unfortunate. The Oke-Ogun region, comprising ten local government areas in northern Oyo State, has long cried foul over marginalization, lacking tertiary institutions, major infrastructure projects, or significant political representation. Historically, Oke-Ogun has been seen as Oyo State’s agrarian belt, producing food for Ibadan and beyond, yet reaping little of the urban development dividends. Creating Oke-Ogun State would have been not just a symbolic gesture of inclusion but an economic masterstroke, given the region’s untapped agricultural potential, mineral resources, and geopolitical significance along the borders of Kwara and Ogun States. Choosing Ibadan over Oke-Ogun seems politically motivated, satisfying urban elite demands while leaving rural voices in limbo.
Anioma State, carved from Delta State’s predominantly Igbo-speaking western bank, presents a different but equally complicated case. The Anioma people, who have long felt culturally distanced from their Itsekiri, Urhobo, and Ijaw counterparts in Delta, yearn for a political space that affirms their Igbo identity. However, critics argue that Delta State’s unity as a multi-ethnic oil-producing giant has balanced resource control debates in the Niger Delta region. Splitting Anioma from Delta could, in the long run, weaken the southern oil bloc’s bargaining power within the Nigerian federation. Yet, the creation of Anioma could unlock developmental attention for towns like Asaba, Ogwashi-Uku, and Ibusa, historically overshadowed by Warri and Sapele in state allocations.
In Ogun State, the agitation for Ijebu State touches a historical nerve. The Ijebu people, once a powerful kingdom with a distinct dialect and trading history, have never fully integrated into the Egba-dominated political structure of present-day Ogun State. The marginalization narrative runs deep, stretching from state capital siting in Abeokuta to perceived underdevelopment of the Ijebu axis. Culturally cohesive and economically viable, the Ijebu argument for statehood rests on both emotional and rational grounds. Yet, critics warn that the new state could become a playground for political godfathers seeking fresh territories to control, given the dominance of elite merchant families in Ijebu Ode and Isonyin.
Meanwhile, the proposed Tiga State, carved from the already fragmented Kano State, raises significant questions about logic and necessity. While proponents argue for administrative efficiency and rural development in the Tiga Dam axis, Kano State’s existing fragmentation—following the earlier creation of Jigawa from Kano—has yet to translate into proportional development for the rural north. Splitting Kano further may simply dilute the commercial strength of northern Nigeria’s economic hub without addressing systemic governance failures.
The creation of Orlu and Etiti States from the densely populated South-East region responds to long-standing cries for balanced representation. Given that the South-East holds only five states, compared to six in other zones and seven in the North-West, proponents argue that equity demands state creation. However, creating micro-ethnic states within Igboland could inadvertently foster intra-Igbo rivalries, as subgroups jostle for dominance within their respective enclaves, potentially weakening the collective bargaining strength of the South-East on the national stage.
Kogi State’s case is even more perplexing. Despite its diverse ethnic composition—comprising Igala, Ebira, and Okun-Yoruba populations—Kogi’s population and economy remain modest. The state still grapples with basic infrastructural challenges, civil service dependency, and poor internal revenue generation. Proposals for a new state from Kogi, especially when compared with more populous and economically significant states like Niger or Kaduna, seem less about economic rationale and more about political convenience. Fragmenting Kogi would likely lead to administrative inefficiency, rather than the grassroots development its proponents promise.
Beyond individual cases, Nigeria must critically question whether the proliferation of states addresses the structural deficiencies of the federation itself. With thirty-six states already surviving largely on federal oil allocations, adding more sub-national units may simply balloon the cost of governance. The danger is not in state creation itself but in uncritically multiplying administrative units without revisiting fiscal federalism, resource control, and revenue generation capacities.
The Senate’s impending ratification of these new states demands sober reflection, not just emotional excitement. Nigeria risks drifting further into a pseudo-federation of fragmented, economically unviable units feeding off an ever-thinning central purse. Without empowering states to generate, retain, and manage their own resources, state creation becomes a ceremonial exercise—a plaster on a festering national wound.
It is expedient that before the Senate grants approval, a comprehensive viability audit of each proposed state is conducted. Demographic strength, economic potential, infrastructural foundation, cultural cohesion, and political sustainability should form the metrics of assessment. More importantly, the conversation must extend beyond administrative creation to constitutional restructuring that empowers states—new or old—to thrive economically and govern responsibly.
Oil Rivers State may satisfy minority demands in Rivers, but whether it can function effectively is another question entirely. Ibadan State makes sense, given its urban strength, yet the continued exclusion of Oke-Ogun exposes the ethnic and urban biases in state creation politics. The viability of Tiga, Orlu, Etiti, and new Kogi-based proposals equally demands scrutiny.
Nigeria’s journey towards equitable federalism cannot be won by carving states in perpetuity. It must be anchored on true fiscal decentralization, political accountability, and economic competitiveness. Only then can any state—new or old—truly become a center of development, identity, and opportunity. As Nigeria redraws its map once again, the time has come to choose wisely, beyond sentiments, and with the future in focus
Economic Implications: Between Promise and Peril
1. Decentralization of Resource Control
The creation of new states could democratize resource access:
• Anioma State, rich in oil and gas, may now negotiate derivation benefits previously concentrated in Delta State’s capital, Asaba.
• Ibadan State, an urban hub, now has the autonomy to manage its internally generated revenue (IGR), free from Oyo State’s centralized budget.
Yet, risks of administrative duplication and infrastructural strain loom large
2. Infrastructural Deficit and State Capital Projects
New states require:
• Administrative complexes
• Judicial courts
• Law enforcement headquarters
• State hospitals and universities
These projects promise job creation but strain federal allocations and local resources. Early capital projects may result in excessive debt accumulation or diversion of funds from social services.
3. Economic Competition and Specialization
Smaller state sizes may encourage:
• Competition for investments
• Localization of industries (e.g., Oil Rivers focusing on petrochemicals, Ibadan on tech innovation, Ijebu on agro-processing)
• Regional economic identities resembling quasi-autonomous markets within Nigeria
However, unregulated competition risks race-to-the-bottom tax policies and inter-state economic hostilities.
4. Revenue Allocation Battles
With more states, federal allocation pie slices shrink:
• Legacy states may protest reduced revenues.
• New states will likely depend heavily on federal subventions initially.
• National fiscal strain could exacerbate unless new revenue frameworks emerge.
Political Dynamics: Power Realignment and New Kingmakers
1. Rise of Local Elites
The creation of new states introduces emerging political actors, often sidelined under old regional hegemonies:
• In Ibadan State, urban technocrats and traditional rulers (e.g., Olubadan’s council) may dominate politics, challenging Oyo’s former Ibadan-Iseyin-Ogbomosho axis.
• Anioma State positions Delta Igbo elites as new power brokers.
• Ijebu State revives historical Ijebu nationalism, empowering the Awujale’s sphere of influence.
2. Ethnic Consolidation vs. National Integration
While giving minority groups platforms for expression, the move may inadvertently:
• Deepen ethnic consciousness
• Marginalize smaller subgroups within new states
• Spark fresh agitations (e.g., demand for Oke-Ogun State in Oyo North)
3. Governorship Battles and Godfatherism
• Politicians from new states will jostle for inaugural governorships, setting the tone for local political cultures.
• Old political godfathers may attempt to extend influence (e.g., former governors from parent states funding loyalists in the new entities).
• New grassroots movements may challenge entrenched power structures.
The Character of Nigerian States: Towards a Fragmented or Federal Future?
Nigeria’s state structure is evolving from:
• Large, multi-ethnic administrative units
To
• Smaller, more homogenous political enclaves
While this promises localized governance and cultural affirmation, it also risks:
• Administrative bloating
• Fragmented national identity
• Hyper-localization of politics over national issues
Whether Nigeria becomes a truly federal nation or a patchwork of competing micro-states depends on:
• Revenue independence
• Constitutional restructuring
• Balanced national representation
Emerging Actors Within the New States
1. Traditional Institutions: Obas, Ezes, Emirs, and chiefs will reclaim political relevance as custodians of identity and local influence.
2. Youth Movements: Agitations that birthed the states will now evolve into governance-focused civil societies demanding accountability from state leaders.
3. Private Sector Players: Local entrepreneurs, contractors, and diaspora investors will shape infrastructure development, especially in capitals of Ibadan, Orlu, and Anioma.
4. Technocrats and Academics: Especially in urban states like Ibadan and Anioma, educated elites may redefine governance narratives, challenging political patronage networks.
5. Religious Institutions: Churches and mosques, especially in Anioma, Oil Rivers, and Ijebu, will retain socio-political leverage.
The creation of new states in Nigeria stands at the intersection of opportunity and danger. Economically, it offers decentralization and localized resource control. Politically, it promises representation but risks ethnic entrenchment. Emerging actors—from traditional rulers to urban youth—will contest for the soul of their new homelands.
For Nigeria as a whole, the process must not end at state creation. Structural reforms, equitable revenue sharing, and constitutional clarity are vital to prevent Nigeria from devolving into an unwieldy cluster of fragile states.
In the coming decade, Nigeria will either emerge as a balanced federation of empowered states or drift toward a fragile union burdened by administrative overreach and ethnic fragmentation.
The character of Nigeria’s states—and the nation itself will depend on what leaders and citizens do next.
Recommendations for Policymakers
• Enact a Revenue Diversification Framework to reduce overreliance on federal allocations.
• Prioritize infrastructural equity in capital city development.
• Establish inter-state cooperation platforms to manage boundary, resource, and trade disputes.
• Encourage civic education and national identity programs within new states.
• Introduce constitutional safeguards limiting further state proliferation without economic viability assessments.
Nigeria’s Map Has Changed. Will Its Destiny Follow?
As state flags are hoisted and new capitals rise, Nigeria stands at a crossroad. Whether this moment of change becomes a renaissance or a regression remains unwritten.
Time will tell.©️ Jide Adesina, 2025.
