With elections scheduled for 15 sub-Saharan countries this year, an Africa Check factsheet looks to the polls for leadership in five volatile states.
Voters will cast their ballots in 15 sub-Saharan African states in 2015. In addition to presidential polls held in Zambia in January and Lesotho in February, voters are to cast their ballots in Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, Mauritius, Sudan, Tanzania and Togo.
South Sudan’s first election since it gained independence in 2011, originally scheduled for June, has been pushed back to 2017 as a result of violence.
Though these elections offer an opportunity for the consolidation of democratic governance on the continent, a number are taking place in countries embroiled in conflict or that have seen political instability in the year leading up to elections.
Burkina Faso and Burundi have experienced violence, while just three of the countries heading for elections – Nigeria, Sudan and CAR – were among the bloodiest countries in Africa in 2014. They accounted for almost 50% of the continent’s around 39 000 conflict deaths, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project. It is possible that elections, if they go ahead as planned, may fuel further violence.
This factsheet unpacks the issues around the polls for executive leadership in these five states.
Nigeria
Challenges have beset the election: Jonathan standing for office for a second term has exacerbated perennial north-south tensions and the Independent National Electoral Commission (Inec) has faced logistical challenges in dispensing voter cards to registered voters and to the roughly one million displaced by Boko Haram attacks.
Security concerns in the northeast of the country have affected polling. In early February, Inec pushed the election back to March 28 owing to the threat posed by Boko Haram, a move criticised by Buhari’s All Progressives Congress. Regional forces have recently made some inroads on the group; they have reclaimed several towns and are planning a major ground and air assault.
Jonathan’s waning popularity as a result of corruption scandals, high unemployment and his lacklustre handling of the Boko Haram crisis would seem to bode well for Buhari, who has extended his support in the south. But with most of his support situated in the north, any cancellation of polling or lack of voter turnout because of Boko Haram threats may affect his chances and call the credibility of the election into question.
General Muhammadu Buhari, the APC Presidential candidate, is one of the Nigerian army generals who has not amassed wealth on the ludicrous state that others have.
Allegations on Gen Buahri
• He is a product and primary beneficiary of the political, ethnic and spiritual corruption that breads economic corruption in Nigeria. He is the current face of the Caliphate and Fulani stranglehold on Nigeria. His double-face campaigns suggest a sinister objective other than personal ambition or patriotic zeal. He is the current champion of the feudal hold on Nigeria’s progress. Feudalism is antithetical to democracy.
• As Petroleum Task Force (PTF) Chairman under Gen. Sani Abacha, Buhari recruited his relation as a consultant to run the organization, and the fellow stole all the money that needed to be stolen (about N25 billion, according to some sources).
• As PTF Chairman, 80% of projects executed by the PTF were located in the North. Someone should ask what he did for Lagos from Bola Tinubu or what he did in the South generally.
• Buhari has been quoted in the press as saying Abacha was not corrupt. All the Abacha loot seized in foreign countries is balderdash to incorruptible Buhari.
2. General Buhari did not fight corruption, and cannot. When he seized power in the December 1983 coup, he kept Shehu Shagari, the profligate President in an Ikoyi Guest House and sent Alex Ekwueme, his Deputy, who had no official portfolio, to Kirikiri prison. All the UPN and NPP Governors were sent to Kirikiri. When the courts tried them and found them not guilty Buhari refused to release them. Governor Adekunle Ajasin was tried thrice and absolved thrice, yet Buhari refused to release him. He only released them after their health had failed, and they died one after the other soon after. Is that how to fight corruption? How many Fulanis did Buhari jail? Or were they all angels?
3. You surely remember that it was the Buhari military regime that changed the colour of the Naira to beat supposed economic saboteurs in 1984. Most Nigerians were caught at the wrong end. You could only withdraw a limited sum of your money in the bank, and you could not deposit beyond a decreed amount. Many people lost their legitimate earnings because of Buhari’s brand of economic management. But guess what? One whole year after the currency had been changed, the old currency which was no longer legal tender was still circulating freely in Sokoto. It was front-page news in the Nigerian Tribune. Can you then see to what intents the rigid rule of Gen Buhari was deployed? The laws were made for the South, definitely not for the Caliphate.
4. Remember the Emir of Gwandu story? While Buhari was waging his economic war, all travellers’ luggage to and from Nigeria was rigorously searched by security agents to prevent the importation of the naira. In the midst of this policy, the Emir of Gwandu arrived Nigeria with 53 suitcases which the Airport Command of the Customs under Atiku Abubakar refuse to clear. But within a moment, Gen Buhari’s ADC Major Jokolo surfaced at the Airport and forcefully cleared the suitcases. Do you know the implication of the ADC to the Head of State personally clearing goods at the airport? It is as good as the C-in-C himself appearing on the scene to clear the goods. Have you ever heard of an ADC to the President of any country leaving his principal to do any other thing under the sun other than the few hours when he is asleep? Gen. Buhari broke his iron laws to pass the Emir of Gwandu. Got the message?
5. The UPN Governors Buhari arrested and jailed were the most efficient in the country at the time. UPN states were called ‘the Progressive States’ and implemented the ‘Four Cardinal Programmes’, which included free education at all levels, free health services, integrated rural development, etc. What happened to these lofty pro-people programmes under Buhari? They were buried, and their propagators imprisoned – some of them for nearly 1,000 years – to underscore his iron rule.
6. Gen. Buhari is the author of the transportation chaos that Lagosians endure daily. He was the one who derailed the lofty Metroline Project of the Jakande Administration and actually paid more compensation to the French for the breach in contract than was required to complete the project. He never accused Jakande of corruption on the project; it was just not in his character to see good done and support it. Now he has been frequenting Lagos, piggy-backed by Bola Tinubu, to
forcefully cleared the suitcases. Do you know the implication of the ADC to the Head of State personally clearing goods at the airport? It is as good as the C-in-C himself appearing on the scene to clear the goods. Have you ever heard of an ADC to the President of any country leaving his principal to do any other thing under the sun other than the few hours when he is asleep? Gen. Buhari broke his iron laws to pass the Emir of Gwandu. Got the message?
5. The UPN Governors Buhari arrested and jailed were the most efficient in the country at the time. UPN states were called ‘the Progressive States’ and implemented the ‘Four Cardinal Programmes’, which included free education at all levels, free health services, integrated rural development, etc. What happened to these lofty pro-people programmes under Buhari? They were buried, and their propagators imprisoned – some of them for nearly 1,000 years – to underscore his iron rule.
6. Gen. Buhari is the author of the transportation chaos that Lagosians endure daily. He was the one who derailed the lofty Metroline Project of the Jakande Administration and actually paid more compensation to the French for the breach in contract than was required to complete the project. He never accused Jakande of corruption on the project; it was just not in his character to see good done and support it. Now he has been frequenting Lagos, piggy-backed by Bola Tinubu, to come and garner the votes he needs to rule Nigeria. Shouldn’t Lagos State reward him with 1000% vote for being such a visionary manager and engineer of progress?
7. A vote for Buhari in the coming Presidential Election is a positive vote for treachery. On 31 December 1983 when Buhari assumed leadership as head of State of Nigeria, he and his gang of professional coup-makers in the army, committed treason against the Constitution and people of Nigeria. It doesn’t matter whether the coup was successful or not. If it had failed, Buhari and his fellow conspirators would have been summarily shot or at best sentence to life in prison. A man who commits treason in any sane society is never rewarded with the crown. The Constitution of Nigeria is against it. If he escaped with his life, it is an insult to parade around the presidential not to talk of seeking power.
8. Buhari’s 20-month rule was characterized by two laws – Decree 2 and Decree 4. Decree 2 empowered him to detain anybody indefinitely and for whatever reason. A fall-out of this jungle law was his clamp down on public opinion. A front-page report in a national newspaper had a telling headline: “Don’t Debate the Future!” Buhari had all the answers to all national problems and any attempt at public discourse was courting a long jail term.
9. Nigerians might not have known the reason why they were barred from debating the future. But now we know. It was during this time that Buhari smuggled Nigeria into OIC. It was Buhari who smuggled Nigeria into OIC. It was Ibrahim Babangida who consolidated it and saw it through. Nigerians only saw the end of the action and not the Buhari beginning of it.
10. Decree No. 4, which Gen. Buhari promulgated also made the publication of truth an offence once a public official claimed to be offended by it. It was the only law of its kind in the whole world.
Sudan
In February 2015, the National Consensus Forces – an alliance of major opposition parties, and civil society and rebel groups – signed the Sudan Call declaration. The group seeks democratic reform: an opening of political space, a transitional government to oversee elections and a move from authoritarian to democratic rule.
But Bashir has proved intransigent. Despite paying lip service to negotiation – he introduced a national dialogue process in early 2014 – he has continued to shut down opposition.
Eighteen of 21 opposition groups taking part in the dialogue process have withdrawn, citing Bashir’s continued clampdown on the press, restrictions on freedom and his decision not to release political detainees, including signatories to the Sudan Call declaration. The regime has jailed opposition politicians who have criticised the Rapid Support Forces, a government-aligned militia accused of war crimes in Darfur. Armed forces killed more than 170 people in September 2013, when they opened fire on those protesting against austerity measures.
The state is embroiled in a long-running conflict with rebels on two fronts: in the western state of Darfur and in the southern states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. With the rebels backing the Sudan Call, further violence ahead of the elections is a distinct possibility. Elections may be delayed in nine constituencies in these regions owing to security issues.
The electoral commission has cleared 15 candidates to run in the election, but most are little known and none is expected to garner much support. With Bashir’s 25-year hold on power further entrenched and little in the way of a united opposition contesting the elections, a democratic change of leadership will be off the cards for at least the next electoral cycle.
Burundi
Incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza’s bid for a third term has faced criticism ahead of the June 26 polls. Critics question the constitutionality of the move but Nkurunziza’s supporters argue that he was elected by the legislature and not popular vote for his first term, thus keeping the extension within constitutional limits. Opposition parties have also accused the government of tampering with the voter registration process.
Given the hurdles the opposition faces, it is unlikely Nkurunziza will lose his hold on power. According to Amnesty International, the ruling party has clamped down on civil rights and liberties, and opposition politicians claim to have been jailed, harassed and attacked by members of the CNDD-FDD youth wing, Imbonerakure.
The Alliance of Democrats for Change, a coalition of most opposition parties, has yet to reach agreement on the single presidential candidate it intends fielding in the election. It is also problematic that the alliance is, according to the Institute for Security Studies, an unlawful organisation. A 2011 law stipulates that coalitions may only form during election periods, meaning it cannot campaign until the government announces the start of election season.
Opposition parties in Burundi – weak and riven with factions through government interference and internal power struggles – will only be given two weeks to campaign once their candidates have been registered officially. Their activities are further restricted in rural areas through Imbonerakure’s reported intimidation of the electorate.
Burkina Faso
Ahead of the 2015 elections, Compaoré looked ready to bid for a fifth term, subject to a constitutional amendment. Citizen protests saw Compaoré resign on October 31 and leave the country a few days later. In his wake, a military government under General Honore Traore claimed power, only to be replaced 24 hours later by another under Colonel Isaac Zida. Subsequent protests against military rule saw the army, civil society and political party leaders agree to a one-year transition to civilian rule under the presidency of former foreign minister Michel Kafando.
The army remains in a strong position in the transitional government, occupying a number of key decision-making posts. Zida retains power as prime minister, members of the armed forces occupy 25 of 90 Cabinet posts and the army holds five major government portfolios, including those of defence and foreign affairs.
Tensions between Zida and the presidential guard may contribute to instability ahead of the election. The guard called on Zida to resign after he had, under popular pressure, called for its disbandment. Though the dust has settled for the moment, tensions between government and the guard, the best armed force in the country, could spill over into violence if not carefully managed.
Though the opposition in Burkina Faso presented a united front against Compaoré‘s bid for a fifth term, it hastraditionally been divided and weak in the face of the political dominance of the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP), with no party laying claim to broad national support.
In 2012 legislative elections, the Union for Progress and Change was a far second to the CDP, winning 19 of the 127 available seats against the CDP’s 70. The Alliance for Democracy and Federation-African Democratic Rally won 18 seats but may suffer in the October election having supported Compaoré‘s bid to extend his term.
The Movement for Progress, a CDP splinter group that formed in January 2014, was thought to pose the largest threat to CDP rule, which may leave it in good standing for the 2015 election.
If the October elections are not considered credible, or if the military is perceived to be attempting to cling to power, citizens who for years have been denied substantive democratic rights may again attempt to change the system.
Central African Republic
Ongoing violence and a lack of funds saw the presidential polls, initially planned for early in 2015, postponed to August with parliamentary elections scheduled for July. Ongoing security issues have raised questions about whether the polls should again be pushed back to allow time for disarmament.
Séléka and anti-Balaka have established political wings, but their commitment to peace and electoral processes is questionable.
Three Séléka factions have formed the Patriotic Rally for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic, the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic and a political wing of the Popular Front for the Renaissance of Central Africa. But Séléka forces have reportedly prevented the country’s electoral authority from setting up offices in six prefectures.
Anti-Balaka also formed a political party late last year – the Central African Party for Unity and Development – promising to lay down arms and, instead, take its battles to the political stage. But the group’s central authority does not have much force in localised cells. Renewed fighting has displaced about 30 000 citizens since January despite a January 28 ceasefire agreement.
In addition to the problems posed by weak and incapacitated state institutions, electoral logistics are an issue. Voter registration is behind schedule because of security issues, a lack of personnel and missing documentation. According to a report by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the voter’s roll will be the most problematic aspect of the election: a national census was last held in 2003, meaning there is little clarity as to the actual population of the country. And many birth and death registries were destroyed in the Séléka advance. The existing 2009 roll, likely to be used if another is not available in time, is said to be biased in favour of Bozizé‘s ethnic group.
In addition to peacekeeping support, there is financial assistance from the international community for the polls, including from the EU and United Nations Development Programme. But a February report by humanitarian news outfit Irin noted that the electoral body faced a shortfall of $33.9-million.
Sixteen politicians have so far declared their candidacy for presidential office, but the ISS report says candidates have until 30 days before the election to register – and registered candidates often step aside at the last minute in return for political concessions – leaving the situation fluid.
2015 Africa election calendar
Togo March 5
Nigeria ** March 28
Sudan** April 2
Mauritius May*
Ethiopia May 24
Burundi** May 26 and June 26
Central African Republic** July and August
Tanzania October*
Burkina Faso** October 11
Cote d’Ivoire October 11
Chad Date to be set
Guinea** Date to be set
Niger Date to be set
* Election dates to be confirmed
** Presidential and parliamentary elections
Source: National Democratic Institute; Researched by JIDE ADESINA
FRENCH VERSION
Popularité du Président nigérian Goodluck Jonathan a diminué à la suite de scandales de corruption, un chômage élevé et sagestion terne de la crise de Boko Haram. (Reuters)
